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Lately, the U.S. commercial banking industry has been 
consolidating. Although some firms have left the industry, 
many more have simply combined with other firms, result-
ing in fewer, bigger banks. Many legislators, regulators, 
bankers, and economists have roundly applauded this con-
solidation trend. In their view, consolidation is a laudable 
market response to industry changes that will bring signifi-
cant benefits such as greater efficiency and a lower rate of 
bank failures. They also see consolidation as an effective 
way to shift resources out of banking, an industry they think 
is plagued with excess capacity. 
We take exception to this widely held positive view of 
consolidation. After examining the available evidence, we 
do not think consolidation will deliver any of the benefits its 
proponents expect from it. That's because consolidation in 
banking does not appear to be primarily due to market 
forces. Although we cannot definitely explain why this trend 
is occurring, the data suggest that a major cause is incentives 
created by government policy. In fact, our investigation 
raises serious questions about the wisdom of certain bank 
regulatory practices. 
The Trend 
The first step in our investigation of the recent banking 
consolidation trend is to define more precisely what we 
mean by consolidation and document that it is actually 
The Editorial Board for this paper was Harold L. Cole, Ravi 
Jagannathan, Preston J. Miller, Arthur J. Rolnick, and Martha L. 
Starr. 
occurring. Consolidation, by our definition, means a de-
crease in the number of firms in the industry combined with 
an increase in their average size. 
Fewer Banks 
There's no doubt that the number of banks has declined 
recently. After reaching a post-Depression high of about 
14,500 in 1984, the number of U.S. insured commercial 
banks dropped to about 12,300 by 1990, a decline of 15 
percent. As Chart 1 reveals, the decline partly reflects the 
exit of failed banks from the industry, but much more it 
reflects the absorption of both ailing and healthy banks into 
branch offices of other banks.
1 Chart 1 also reveals that the 
large decline in the number of banks does not necessarily 
reflect a sick industry, for the number of new banks has not 
dropped dramatically. In fact, in the past five years, new 
banks have entered the industry at a 1.6 percent annual rate 
(newly chartered banks as a percentage of total banks). This 
is only slightly slower than in the first half of the 1980s, and 
it's faster than in the 1960s or the 1970s. 
The evidence for consolidation is even more compelling 
when we shift from banks to banking organizations. A 
banking organization, such as a bank holding company, 
* Also, Adjunct Professor of Finance, University of Minnesota. 
1A high proportion of failed banks are absorbed by healthy banks under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) purchase and assumption 
option. The acquiring bank purchases some of the assets and assumes the deposits 
and other liabilities of the failed bank. The acquiring bank may also pay a premium 
to the FDIC representing in part the value of the failed bank's charter. 
3 Chart 1 
Although Still Healthy, Entries Have Lately 
Been Outweighed by Exits in the Banking Industry. 
Changes in the Number of U.S. Insured Commercial Banks 
Annually, 1960-90 
•I Additions Subtractions: • Failures 
(NewBanks> Mergers 
Banks 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
usually includes more than one bank. Changes in the number 
of these firms provide a better measure of banking consoli-
dation because in them management decisions are generally 
made at the top; the true economic entity is the total 
organization. Between 1976 and 1990, the number of U.S. 
banking organizations declined 24 percent, roughly ten 
percentage points more than the number of banks declined. 
The larger contraction in the number of banking organiza-
tions reflects the acquisition and conversion of independent 
banks into bank holding company subsidiaries (which retain 
their individual bank charters), rather than into branches. 
This multibank ownership structure largely reflects state 
branching restrictions. 
Bigger Banks 
Now let's complete our documentation of consolidation: 
While the number of banking firms has been shrinking, the 
average size of banking firms has been growing. 
To see this, we can't look just at the changes in the share 
of all assets held by firms of different sizes; we must also 
look at the changes in the number of firms of each size. 
Between 1976 and 1987, the number of banking organiza-
tions with total assets less than $50 million dropped from 85 
percent to 62 percent of all banking organizations, and their 
share of total assets dropped from 17 percent to 6 percent 
(Table 1). At the high end, firms with total assets of $5 billion 
or more, the number of firms rose from 0.2 percent to 0.9 
percent of all banking organizations, and their share of total 
assets rose from 30 percent to 59 percent. Note that this 
group of large banks is the only size group that increased its 
share of assets between 1976 and 1987. This remains true 
even after the asset data are adjusted for inflation. 
The growth in asset size, however, does not seem to be 
concentrated at the very top. Chart 2 shows the domestic 
market share of the 100 largest U.S. banking organizations. 
Between 1977 and 1990, it increased from 50 percent to 65 
percent. Most of the gains, though, occurred at banks ranked 
11th or lower.
2 
Are Market Forces Behind the Trend? 
Thus, the evidence reveals a recent rapid consolidation trend 
in the U.S. banking industry. Why is this trend occurring? 
The popular belief is that market forces are causing banking 
consolidation; the industry is adjusting to take advantage of 
economies of scale, to eliminate excess capacity, and to 
reduce the risk of bank failure. The available evidence, 
however, does not generally support this popular belief. 
Scale Economies? 
Consolidation, particularly in-market mergers, will reduce the 
number of institutions chasing marginal business and running 
up the cost of funds. And it will allow substantial overhead 
reductions without impairing the ability of banks to serve their 
customers properly. 
This comment (Isaac 1990, p. 4) reflects the popular view 
that banking is an industry which exhibits broad economies 
of scale. If that were true, then the recent consolidation in 
banking could be the result of natural market forces driving 
the industry toward bigger firms in order to achieve lower 
costs and higher profitability. Unfortunately, however, the 
popular view appears to be largely incorrect. 
A firm is said to exhibit economies of scale when its 
average cost of production declines as the quantity of its 
output increases. In theory, such economies could extend 
indefinitely. In fact, however, the available data show some-
thing different for commercial banking: after banks reach a 
fairly modest size, there is no cost advantage to further 
expansion. Some evidence even suggests diseconomies of 
scale for the very largest banks. 
2One explanation for the small gain in the industry share of the 10 largest 
banking firms is that they generally have been excluded from interstate banking 
expansion. Most state laws permitting entry by out-of-state banks restrict entry to 
banks from specified states, once reciprocity is established. All but one of the top 
10 firms are domiciled either in New York or in California, and these states are not 
generally included in reciprocity agreements. 
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Table 1 
Bigger Banks Have Been Getting Bigger... 
Number of U.S. Banking Firms and the Assets They Held, 
Grouped by Size of Firm, 1976 vs. 1987 
Number of Firms Assets Held 
Firms % of All Firms Billions of $ % of All Assets 
Asset Size of Firms  1976  1987 
Deflated 
1987*  1976  1987 
Deflated 
1987*  1976  1987 
Deflated 
1987*  1976  1987 
Deflated 
1987* 
Less Than $50 Mil.  10,542  6,389  8,902  85.0  62.2  86.6  167.7  152.0  133.7  16.7  5.9  13.3 
$50 M i I .—$100 Mil.  943  2,071  719  7.6  20.1  7.0  64.0  143.9  48.5  6.4  5.5  4.8 
$100 Mil.-$1 Bil.  767  1,557  511  6.2  15.1  5.0  207.7  358.9  142.5  20.7  13.8  14.2 
$1 Bil.-$5 Bil.  130  173  108  1.0  1.7  1.1  265.2  401.9  242.3  26.4  15.5  24.1 
$5 Bil. or More  22  89  39  .2  .9  .4  299.1  1,540.6  436.7  29.8  59.3  43.5 
*These columns represent the distribution after bank assets have been deflated by the change 
in total domestic banking assets between 1976 and 1987. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
modest size of $100 million in deposits. (In 1988, for 
example, over 3,000 banks had total deposits between 
$50 million and $200 million.) Clark (1988) provides an 
excellent survey of this large literature. He reports that of 13 
studies of economies of scale in banking, only 2 have found 
significant scale economies above $ 100 million in deposits. 
And since Clark's survey, several studies have actually 
found diseconomies of scale for very large banking firms, 
those in the multibillion-dollar range (for example, Berger 
and Humphrey 1990). 
Although there is a general consensus in this literature, 
researchers have not been unanimous in their conclusions. 
Thus, it would be reassuring if we could explain why 
different researchers have obtained somewhat different 
results. And we can. A recent study by Humphrey (1990) 
considers these studies and concludes that different results 
can generally be explained by differences in assumptions, 
methodology, or both.
3 Humphrey (1990, p. 48) ends his 
3Humphrey (1990) makes three main points. First, some studies have exam-
ined just operating costs which, he argues, will bias their results in the direction of 
finding scale economies. The more appropriate variable to consider is total costs, 
including overhead and indirect costs. Second, early studies used linear (Cobb-
Douglas) production functions, which are also biased in the direction of finding 
economies of scale. Humphrey argues for the use of nonlinear production functions 
in this research. Third, and finally, some studies have taken as their size measure 
individual office size instead of the overall size of the banking firm. Such studies 
also ignore overhead and administrative costs. 
• Past Studies 
Many researchers have studied scale economies among U.S. 
banking firms. Most such studies find significant scale 
economies in the industry, as predicted by theory, but they 
also suggest that these are exhausted below the relatively 
Chart 2 
... But Not, Primarily, the Top 10. 
% of All U.S. Assets Held by the 100 Largest Banking Firms, 1977 vs. 1990 
Firms Ranked by Asset Size: 
51-100 26-50 11-25 
1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
5 Tables 2 and 3 
Bigger Doesn't Mean More Profitable... 
Table 2 
... Among All U.S. Banks ... 
Measures of Profitability and Leverage for All U.S. Commercial Banks by Size of Assets 
Annual Averages, 1972—90t 
Asset Size 
Less Than $25 Mil.- $100 Mil - $1 Billion 
$25 Mil. $100 Mil. $1 Bil. or More 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Return on Assets 
(Net Income as % of Total Assets) 
1972-75  .92  .86  .75  .72 
1976-79  .97  1.00  .84  .59 
1980-83  1.01  1.07  .88  .59 
1984-87  .86  1.02  .98  .69 
1988-901:  n.a.  .72  .82  .54 
Return on Equity 
(Net Income as % of Equity Capital) 
1972-75  11.9  12.2  11.6  12.0 
1976-79  11.3  12.9  12.2  12.2 
1980-83  10.7  13.0  12.4  12.5 
1984-87  9.0  12.3  13.9  8.8 
1988-90*  n.a.  8.2  10.9  10.0 
Equity/Asset Ratio 
(Equity Capital as % of Total Assets) 
1972-75  7.8  7.0  6.5  6.0 
1976-79  8.5  7.7  6.9  6.5 
1980-83  9.5  8.7  7.1  6.3 
1984-87  9.0  8.0  6.9  5.2 
1988-90+  n.a.  8.9  7.5  5.6 
fBecause of data irregularities, for 1972-75, bank size is based on total deposits; for all other periods, it is based on 
total assets. Annual averages are weighted (aggregate) averages of banks in each size class except those for 1984— 
87, which are medians of individual bank ratios. Where size classes have been combined, the 1984-87 measures 
are weighted averages of the median values. 
{Data for 1990 are preliminary. For banks with total assets less than $25 million, 1990 data are not available; these 
banks are included in the next largest size class. 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
study this way: 
Overall, a consensus conclusion of the preferred studies on 
bank scale economies suggests that the average cost curve in 
banking reflects a relatively flat U-shape at the firm level, with 
significant economies at small banks ... but small and sig-
nificant diseconomies at the largest This relatively flat U-
shape also holds even when large banks are viewed separately. 
• Another Look 
Having examined what other researchers have found, we 
now look at the data ourselves. Rather than examining bank 
costs, though, we study bank profitability. Profits are a 
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Table 3 
... Or Among the Largest. 
Measures of Profitability and Leverage for a Sample of U.S. Bank Holding Companies by Size of Assets 














Profitability  Return on Assets 
(Net Income as % of Total Assets) 
1.0  1.5  .9  .9  .5  14.5* 
Return on Equity 
(Net Income as % of Equity Capital) 
12.8  13.2  12.7  13.5  11.5  1.43* 
Leverage  Equity/Asset Ratio 
(Equity Capital as % of Total Assets) 
5.9  6.6  5.9  5.7  4.4  21.3 
The Sample  Number of Firms  131  48  36  27  20 
Average Total Assets ($ Bil.)  8.13  2.01  3.39  6.55  33.50 
fF-test for significance of difference of group means (one-way ANOV). 
'Significant at 99% confidence level. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Compustat Services, Inc. 
broader measure than costs, but obviously the two are 
closely related. Profits have the advantage of being a more 
readily available measure. 
Table 2 displays two standard profitability measures for 
U.S. insured commercial banks over the period 1972-90: 
the rate of return on assets (ROA) and the rate of return on 
equity (ROE). Banks are grouped there in four size catego-
ries based (primarily) on their total assets. Weighted average 
annual rates of return are averaged in four-year intervals, 
except that median annual rates of return are averaged in the 
1984-87 period. Of necessity, the final period is shorter than 
four years. 
Key features of these data are consistent with the findings 
of the literature just reviewed: specifically, neither very 
small nor very large banks are the most profitable. In Ta-
ble 2 profitability generally increases with bank size, but 
reaches a maximum before the largest. The single exception 
to the pattern of interior maximum is the ROA profitability 
measure for 1972-75, when the highest return was recorded 
by the smallest banks, those with assets less than $25 
million. 
You may notice an apparent discrepancy in the two 
profitability measures: the largest banks appear to have done 
much worse than the other bank groups according to the 
ROA, but not according to the ROE. This can be understood 
by examining the leverage measure that is also displayed on 
Table 2. The equity/asset ratio measures capital adequacy— 
what decline in asset values could be covered by a firm's 
equity. The smaller this measure is, the riskier is the firm 
(with other relevant factors held constant). As is clear in 
Table 2, larger banks tend to be more highly leveraged than 
other banks. Of course, the smaller equity is, the greater 
income will appear as a percentage of equity. Therefore, to 
compare banks across size classes, the ROE is a somewhat 
deceptive measure of profitability.
4 (The Appendix pro-
vides a more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
4For that reason, many researchers prefer to use the ROA measure in such 
comparisons by size group. 
7 the ROA and the ROE.) 
The published banking industry data are not very enlight-
ening for very large banks—those with assets of $ 1 billion 
and more. That broad size category could be masking 
economies of scale at some very large size. Unfortunately, 
we cannot look for that in the published data; size categories 
have been changed repeatedly over the last two decades, 
making intertemporal comparisons difficult. However, we 
can study data for a sample of 131 large bank holding 
companies. 
Table 3 shows for that sample the same profitability and 
leverage measures used for banks in Table 2. We've dis-
played these measures for the whole sample and for four size 
classes, all over the full period 1971-87. The results of tests 
for the statistical significance of differences in group means 
are also provided. 
The sample results are generally consistent with the 
published banking industry data. For the large banking 
firms, the ROE measure of profitability is not significantly 
different across size classes. But the largest size class does 
have the lowest average ROE, consistent with the finding of 
diseconomies of scale for very large firms. For the ROA 
measure, the differences among size classes are statistically 
highly significant, and they favor the smaller firms. Here, as 
in the bank data, there is a definite relationship between size 
and the use of financial leverage. 
• Summary 
Our analysis of bank and bank holding company data over 
the last two decades is fully consistent with the main 
conclusions of the literature. Economies of scale are cap-
tured at a modest size, and once that size is reached, further 
increases do not improve profitability. In fact, there is some 
evidence that very large banking firms are less profitable 
than middle-sized ones. Thus, the evidence does not support 
the popular belief that a quest for economies of scale is 
behind the banking industry's consolidation.
5 
Excess Capacity? 
The U.S. banking system must wring out its excess capacity 
.... The real driving force in the cutback in capacity will be 
an inevitable, sweeping consolidation. That alone should help 
U.S. banks compete with foreign banks. 
This notion that the banking industry is sodden with excess 
capacity is another popular market explanation for the 
current consolidation trend (McColl 1991, p. 7). This expla-
nation, like the first, does not stand up well to scrutiny. 
DA Fuzzy Picture 
Some seem to think excess capacity in banking is an 
established fact. Chart 3, for example, is an illustration from 
Chart 3 
Is Banking a Declining Industry? ... 
% of All Financial Assets Held by Depository Institutions 
and the Rest of the Financial Sector* 
Annually, 1974-89 
'Includes pension and retirement funds, insurance companies, agencies and mortgage pools, 
mutual and money market funds, and the monetary authority. 
Source: U.S. Treasury 1991 
the recent report describing the U.S. Treasury's (1991) 
proposals for reform of the banking industry. The picture it 
paints seems clear: The industry's share of financial inter-
5In one situation, the merger of two banks seems bound to deliver substantial 
cost savings: when the banks both have large networks of branches which 
substantially overlap. By merging, it seems, the two banks can close many 
duplicating branches and reduce overhead costs considerably. 
However, a recent study of such mergers (Savage 1991) concludes that the 
resulting cost savings are likely to be trivial. It offers several reasons for this 
conclusion. First, careful investigation reveals that, although U.S. banks have over 
48,000 branches in this country, their branching networks don't overlap much. 
Thus, "even massive closings of overlapping branches would result in only a small 
percentage change in the national total of bank branches" (Savage 1991, p. 1). 
Second, indirect branch costs are not high relative to the direct costs of serving bank 
customers. And third, the study's estimates are based on a statistical cost function 
(developed by Berger and Humphrey 1990) which exhibits diseconomies of scale. 
The merger study does not mention one significant point: when two banks have 
large, overlapping branching systems, they are (by definition) large banks and 
direct competitors. Merging them will necessarily reduce competition and may 
render the survivor more profitable simply because of its enhanced ability to earn 
monopoly rents (a subject we will discuss further later in this paper). For obvious 
reasons, bankers are loathe to mention rent-seeking as a possible motive for 
merging. But banking industry security analysts are less inhibited, and they clearly 
recognize the link between market concentration and profitability. For example, 
Alpert and Lynch (1991a, p. 68) state that "the lack of competition in Arizona, 
Nevada, and Oregon has allowed . . . [two banks] ... to scrape by despite their 
horrendous losses in real estate lending" and that a "healthy Maine bank ... also 
should benefit from the disappearance of so much competition." Elsewhere Alpert 
and Lynch (1991b, p. 35) state that "Ideally, the benefits of a large intramarket 
merger should include . .. reduction of competition. If enough competitors in a 
market consolidate, a resulting oligopoly should lead to more control over pricing. 
Deposit rates could be set low and consumer and middle-market lending rates set 
high." 
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Chart 4 
... Maybe Not. 
Shares of U.S. Gross National Product Produced by Banking 
and by Other Finance and Insurance Industries* 
Annually, 1947-87 
"The nonbank finance and insurance industries do not include real estate. 
Source: U.S. Department ot Commerce 
mediation has declined substantially over 15 years. Such 
seemingly irrefutable evidence suggests to some that re-
sources need to be moved from banking to other industries, 
and that is why we see banks consolidating. 
Actually, the picture is not nearly so clear. 
First, much of the nonbank financial intermediary claims 
produce profits for commercial banks, even though banks 
don't hold them. One example is commercial paper borrow-
ing. Although this borrowing is not in the form of bank loans, 
commercial paper issuers must have backup credit lines. 
These are usually issued by banks—which do not provide 
them for free. Another example is money market mutual 
funds, an important competitor to bank deposits. While 
these balances are not held by commercial banks, virtually 
every check written against them clears through the com-
mercial banking system. And again, banks charge a fee for 
this service. Other examples abound. 
A second reason the declining market share picture is not 
as clear as it may seem is that an increasingly substantial 
amount of the business done by commercial banks will not 
show up in the asset totals used to measure market share. The 
most rapidly growing product lines of banks are off-balance 
sheet activities that are invisible in these totals. Examples 
include standby letters of credit and other off-balance sheet 
guarantees, options, and forward contracts. Moreover, banks 
now originate billions of dollars of loans which are sold in 
the secondary market and don't appear on their balance 
sheets. That activity covers a wide spectrum of loans, 
including residential mortgages, credit card and other con-
sumer loans, and commercial loans. Although banks may 
not be the ultimate holders of these loans, they are key 
players in originating and servicing them, and they earn 
substantial fee income in the process. 
So, to a considerable extent, what pictures like Chart 3 
reflect is not a loss of market share by commercial banks as 
much as a massive change in the way banks do business. In 
particular, it reflects the spectacular growth of off-balance 
sheet activity, fee income, and secondary-market loan sales. 
Perhaps a better measure of market share change would 
be the disaggregation of the gross national product (GNP) by 
industry. This is assembled and published by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Chart 4 shows, for 1947-87, the 
share of GNP accounted for by the nonbank finance and 
insurance industries and the share accounted for by banking. 
Note that both banking and nonbank finance and insurance 
industries increased their share of GNP over this period. 
Moreover, they grew at almost the same rate over the period 
1947-85. In 1986 and 1987, however, the nonbank sector 
grew much faster than the banks. Overall, this is a totally 
different picture than the 15-year decline shown by the 
balance sheet data. In particular, the GNP data suggest that 
both types of industries have been growing faster than the 
overall economy. 
• Some Fuzzy Economics 
Determining if banks really are losing market share (and, if 
so, the timing and extent of that loss) is beyond the scope of 
this study. But, then, it's more than we need to do. For even 
if the aggregate demand for bank services is declining, it 
does not follow that consolidation in banking is inevitable or 
desirable. 
Assume for a moment that banking is indeed a declining 
industry. If this is true, then redeployment of resources to 
other industries would be the expected and economically 
desirable response. However, that objective would not nec-
essarily require consolidation. Nor would consolidation 
necessarily achieve that objective. Larger average firm size 
would not lower costs—it could raise them—and larger 
banks would be at a strategic disadvantage. 
In and of themselves, combinations of banks merely shift 
resources around within the industry, resulting in larger 
average firm size. Obviously, after banks merge, some 
resources are often let go to other industries. However, 
banks can achieve that objective without merging: by in-
creasing their dividend payout ratios to redeploy equity, 
firing some employees to redeploy labor, and so on. If all 
banks were to do this proportionally to size, resources would 
be appropriately shifted out of the industry, and the average 
9 size of banks would fall, not rise. 
The idea that mergers are a natural and inevitable re-
sponse of banks to a decline in demand follows from an 
invalid, often implicit, assumption that there are economies 
of scale to be captured by increasing firm size. As we have 
seen, economies of scale in banking are fully achieved at a 
modest size, and diseconomies may exist at very large 
banks.
6 
The relevant economic theory does not predict consoli-
dation; it predicts exit by large banking firms. Ghemawat 
and Nalebuff (1985), for example, have studied structural 
changes in a model of an oligopoly industry which is 
experiencing declining demand. They find that when there 
are constant returns-to-scale, the largest firms exit first. This 
occurs for strategic reasons: as demand falls in an oligopoly 
market, the smaller firms can remain profitable longer, and 
this greater survivability allows them to drive larger firms 
out of business. Ghemawat and Nalebuff further show that 
under certain circumstances large firms will have an incen-
tive to acquire small ones and simply eliminate their produc-
tive capacity. However, there is never an incentive to 
combine large firms, since size alone produces a strategic 
disadvantage. 
Although Ghemawat and Nalebuff s study is theoretical, 
they cite case studies of declining industries which conform 
to the predictions of the theory. Among these are the U.K. 
steel casings industry and the U.S. machine tool industry. 
Research in business policy also emphasizes the advantage 
small plants have in industries experiencing declining de-
mand (for example, Hall 1980). And commercial banking 
fits Ghemawat and Nalebuff s assumptions reasonably well, 
if we assume the industry is declining. As we have seen, all 
feasible economies of scale are attained by relatively small 
banks. If there are diseconomies for very large banks, as 
some believe, that would only sharpen the theory's predic-
tions. Considerable evidence also exists that at least some 
bank loan and deposit markets are imperfectly competitive. 
Finally, the key prediction of the theory—that large firms 
will exit first—is consistent with the severe financial diffi-
culty that many large banks have experienced recently. 
However, what is totally inconsistent with predictions of 
the theory is the recent consolidation trend, which includes 
an increasing average firm size. There is no technical 
advantage in this trend, and there will be a technical disad-
vantage if scale diseconomies exist. In addition, theory 
suggests there is a strategic disadvantage to large size. Thus, 
it's difficult to explain consolidation as a market response to 
declining demand for banking services. 
• Summary 
Is there excess capacity to wring out of the banking industry, 
as proponents of consolidation claim? The answer is far 
from obvious. The data used by proponents of consolidation 
are misleading, in part because of recent changes banks have 
made from asset-based to off-balance sheet activities. How-
ever, even if proponents are right and banking is a declining 
industry, that apparently cannot explain the recent wave of 
mergers. For that explanation to make sense, there would 
have to be economies of scale for large banks, which there 
are not; or consolidation would have had to primarily 
involve small banks, which it has not. Both theory and 
evidence from other industries suggest that in industries 
with excess capacity and constant returns-to-scale, it is the 
larger firms which exit first. 
Safety? 
To save the banking system, reform of the banking laws must 
provide for: diversification of risk, larger institutions and a 
national regulatory scheme .... It is instructive to note that 
of the 5,000 banks that failed in the 1920s ... most were tiny 
and dependent on farm or real estate loans. 
This is the last popular explanation for consolidation: that 
average-bank size increases reflect a natural attempt to 
"save" the banking industry (Chernow 1990, p. A14). Con-
solidation proponents applaud the trend they think will 
result in fewer bank failures, since very large banks can 
diversify their investments and so reduce their risk. Unfor-
tunately, the applause is premature and, ultimately, inappro-
priate. 
Of course, large banks are better able than small banks to 
diversify. Large banks can make a greater variety of differ-
ent kinds of loans, each of which demands some unique 
expertise and specialized staff. They can lend in more 
geographic areas through branching networks, loan produc-
tion offices, and the like. If they choose to invest in a 
branching network, they can obtain retail deposits from a 
wider geographic area. Finally, they can access liability 
markets unavailable to smaller banks, such as those for 
commercial paper, bank acceptances, Eurodollars, and Eu-
robonds. 
All of this, however, describes what large banks can do, 
not what they necessarily do do. That's an important distinc-
tion because (as is well known) distortions caused by deposit 
insurance result in moral hazard, which reduces or elimi-
nates banks' aversion to risk. As we have already seen, large 
banks use systematically more financial leverage than small 
banks, and (other things constant) financial leverage in-
6Moreover, if scale economies were the principal explanation for the recent 
consolidation trend, it would have occurred mostly among the smaller banks, those 
with less than SI00 million in total deposits, which is not where we have seen it. 
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creases risk of failure. Thus, it is not clear that because large 
banking firms are better able to diversify, they are less likely 
to fail. 
• Too Big to Fail 
In a very narrow sense, very large banking firms are unques-
tionably less risky than smaller firms. But this is due to 
special regulatory treatment. 
Under normal market conditions, when a corporation 
fails or goes into bankruptcy, it defaults on its debt obliga-
tions. Its creditors put the firm into bankruptcy proceedings, 
and they cannot do that unless the firm has defaulted. 
Under a unique regulatory policy, this is not allowed to 
happen to very large banks. If abankis so large that its failure 
might have consequences for the national economy, then the 
government considers that bank too big to fail. When such 
a bank is in serious financial trouble, the government always 
pays off its creditors. The government infuses public money 
into the bank and either operates it under government 
management (as was done with Continental Illinois) or 
arranges for a shotgun-wedding merger with a healthier 
bank (as was done with First Republic of Texas). 
Under these conditions, the too-big-to-fail bank has not 
failed in the sense that losses are realized by its debt holders. 
But it certainly has failed in the sense that it has experienced 
losses sufficient to wipe out its equity—and then some. 
Thus, from a creditor's perspective, too-big-to-fail banks 
are less risky than others. But from a public policy perspec-
Table 4 
Bigger Doesn't Mean Less Risky. 
Failures Among Small and Large Banks 
As % of All U.S. Banks of Each Size, 1971-88* 
Time Period 
Asset Size of Banks 1971-79 1980-88 1971-88 
Small .49 5.71 6.18 
(Less Than $1 Billion) 
Larget 2.19 8.00 12.55 
($1 Billion or More) 
*For each size class, percentages are based on the cumulative number of 
failures and the average annual number of banks of that size over the time 
period specified. Over this 18-year period, the average number of small 
banks was 14,301; the average number of laFge banks, 231. Failures of 
small banks averaged 49 per year; large banks, 1.61 per year. Failure data 
reported by the FDIC include federally insured savings banks. 
tFor a list of all large banks that failed during 1971-88, see footnote 7. 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
tive (that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or 
the taxpayers who back it), that is a rather myopic point of 
view. 
• The Data 
Do big banks actually fail less often than small banks? The 
data say, no—not when too-big banks that required govern-
ment assistance are classified as failures. 
A simple head count may be behind the popular miscon-
ception that larger banks are less risky than smaller banks. 
Over the 18-year period starting in 1971, many more banks 
with assets less than $ 1 billion have failed than larger banks: 
884 vs. 29.
7 Counting bank failures by size of bank, how-
ever, is not good enough. On average during this period, the 
United States had about 14,300 small banks and only about 
230 large banks. What we need to know is not just the 
number of failures, but what percentage of all banks of each 
size failed. This failure rate, as Table 4 shows, has been twice 
as great for the large banks as for the small ones. 
Some may think that this difference has only appeared in 
the last decade, as the large banks have been hard hit by 
unusually high losses on loans to developing nations, the 
energy industry, and the commercial real estate industry. 
Note in Table 4, however, that the large bank failure rate 
was greater in both the 1970s and the 1980s. 
• Summary 
The data do not support the notion that consolidation is 
occurring because larger banks are better positioned to 
diversify and are thus less risky. The empirical evidence 
shows that, contrary to popular belief, in recent years, larger 
banks have gotten into trouble more often than smaller 
banks. 
If Not Market Forces, What? 
The consolidation trend is real, but it is not (easily) explained 
by any natural market forces of which we are aware. What, 
then, can explain it? Why are large and medium-sized banks 
so eager to combine? If the explanation is not in private 
market forces, the natural place to look is in public policies. 
Too Big to Fail, Revisited 
The government's too-big-to-fail policy may produce an 
7The 29 commercial and savings banks with assets of Si billion or more that 
required FDIC assistance during this period are listed here, grouped by the year 
they failed: 1972, Bank of the Commonwealth; 1973, United States NB; 1974, 
Franklin NB; 1980, First Pennsylvania NB; 1981, Greenwich SB and Union Dime 
SB; 1982, Western NY SB, NY Bank for Savings, and Western SB; 1983, Dry 
Dock SB and FNB Midland, Texas; 1984, Continental Illinois; 1985, Bowery SB; 
1986, FNB Oklahoma City and BankOklahoma; 1987, BankTEXAS, Syracuse 
SB, and First City Bankcorp, Texas (2 banks); 1988, First Republic, Texas (4 
banks), United Bank Alaska, M Corp., Texas (3 banks), Texas American Bankshares, 
and National Bankshares, Inc. (NBI), Texas. 
11 incentive for banks to increase their size. After all, if a bank 
gets big enough to be considered too big to fail, it gets 
implicit guarantees for all its liabilities, whether they are 
insured deposits or not. The bank does not have to pay for 
these guarantees, since deposit insurance premiums are only 
assessed against deposits. So, in essence, attaining a certain 
size provides a bank with some free insurance and more 
complete coverage than it would get otherwise. 
The empirical evidence on this nonmarket incentive 
issue is mixed, however. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1991) 
find no evidence that the equity shares of too-big banking 
firms are more highly valued than are shares of smaller 
banking firms. Such higher valuation might be expected if 
too-big firms were systematically benefiting by their status. 
Using modern option pricing theory, Kuester and O'Brien 
(1991) estimate die value of government insurance and find 
that it is not systematically related to size. However, O' Hara 
and Shaw (1990) report that equity investors did respond to 
an official pronouncement of the too-big-to-fail policy in 
1984. Using an event testing approach, they find immediate 
price increases in the shares of the banks believed to be in 
that category. 
Until more research is done, the size-incentive effects of 
the too-big-to-fail policy must be viewed as undetermined. 
Common sense suggests that this policy encourages large 
size, but so far the empirical results are mixed. 
Too Hard to Take Over 
Another government policy that might be encouraging 
increases in bank size is the (unintentional) regulatory 
protection from hostile takeovers that bank managers often 
enjoy. This protected position could be related to the bank-
ing consolidation trend because bank managers do seem to 
have an incentive to create bigger banks—an incentive that 
is unrelated to increased efficiency. 
The data suggest that, regardless of bank profitability, the 
bigger the bank, the bigger the compensation package its top 
managers receive. We determined this by studying recent 
data for a sample of the 50 largest bank holding companies. 
Using standard statistical techniques, we investigated the 
relationship between managerial salaries (and bonuses) and 
three banking firm characteristics—total asset size, total 
asset growth, and profitability (measured by the ROA). The 
results: compensation is positively and significantly related 
to asset size, but not significantly related to either profitabil-
ity or asset growth.
8 
Over the long haul, of course, any management will have 
a hard time pursuing its own objectives at the expense of 
shareholders. However, bank managers do have more free-
dom to do this than managers in other industries because one 
of the most effective tools for ousting bad management is 
essentially inoperative in banking: the hostile takeover. The 
regulated nature of banking makes hostile takeovers ex-
tremely difficult to execute (perhaps unintentionally). All 
bank mergers require time-consuming regulatory approval. 
In fact, hostile takeovers were unheard of in banking until a 
few years ago, and they still are rare. 
More work needs to be done on the topic of managerial 
incentives in banking, and the results presented here (based 
on a small sample and a short time period) should be viewed 
as exploratory. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that, even 
without scale efficiencies, bank managers have a personal 
financial incentive to expand their firms and perhaps more 
latitude to do so because of the way their industry is 
regulated.
9 
Too Able to Increase Market Share 
A final government policy that could be behind the banking 
consolidation trend is the policy of allowing—or even 
encouraging—banks in the same market to merge. These 
sorts of mergers often increase the market share of the 
merged banks and could increase their ability to earn mo-
nopoly rents. 
General evidence on U.S. bankmergers supports the idea 
of a relationship between this bank behavior and the 
8We used an ordinary least-squares regression. Managerial salaries, M, are 
represented by the 1989 compensation (including bonuses) of corporate chief 
executives as reported in the October 19, 1990, Business Week. Bank size is 
represented by the log of total assets, A, at yearend 1988; bank growth, by the 
average annual growth in total assets, AA/A, in 1986-88; and profitability, by the 
average annual ROA, tt/A, in 1986-88. The data on the independent variables 
come from quarterly reports submitted by bank holding companies to the Federal 
Reserve. The time lag between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable reflects the assumption that managerial salaries are partly based on past 
performance. Our sample consisted of the 50 largest domestic bank holding com-
panies, but incomplete data reduced the number of firms in the regression to 42. 
The results of the regression (with f-values in parentheses): 
M = 136.5 + 265.9[ln(A)] - 0.52 (AA/A) + 26.3 (ir/A). 
(5.05) (0.10) (0.32) 
R
2 = 0.40. 
These results are not materially affected by different averaging periods for the 
explanatory variables or different specifications of the regression. 
9Many industries besides commercial banking exhibit a positive relationship 
between firm size and management compensation. This does not necessarily argue 
against the existence of a pro-size incentive for bank managers; it may instead 
suggest that other industries share this incentive. See, for example, Brown and 
Medoff 1989. 
A recent fascinating study by Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) sheds additional 
light on the issue of managerial incentives and acquisition strategies in commercial 
banking. This study finds that most acquisitions are made by banks with en-
trenched managers, banks with a high fraction of inside equity ownership by the 
management group and diffuse holdings otherwise (spread among outside inves-
tors). The study further finds that stock prices respond negatively (on average) to 
acquisition announcements by banks with entrenched managers, but positively to 
such announcements by other banks. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
when management groups have sufficient control, they may pursue acquisition 
strategies inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
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Chart 5 
Bigger Does Mean More of the Market. 
Average Annual % of Total Bank Deposits in U.S. Urban Markets 
Held by the 3 Largest Banks, 1976-89 
0, Bank Merger 
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Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
government's policy toward it. That many of the bank 
mergers of recent years have occurred among competitors in 
the same market is well known. However, we know of no 
source which categorizes bank mergers by whether or not 
the banks involved were in the same market. Still, the data 
in Chart 5 are highly suggestive. The chart shows the annual 
average share of total bank deposits held by the largest three 
banks in urban markets in the United States from 1976 to 
1989. This concentration ratio declined from 68.45 percent 
in 1976 to a low point of 65.83 in 1982 and then climbed 
fairly steadily, reaching 67.65 in 1989. The general rise in 
this ratio since 1982 reflects a liberalized attitude toward 
within-market mergers adopted by the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment and bank regulatory authorities. Indeed, the turn-
around in the ratio dovetails with the Justice Department's 
loosening of its bank merger guidelines in 1982.
1
0 
Research on concentration in banking suggests a rela-
tionship between market structure and pricing. Higher loan 
rates and lower deposit rates are seen in more concentrated 
markets (Berger and Hannan 1989, Sharpe 1990). In other 
words, there is evidence of some ability for banks to earn 
monopoly rents, at least in some markets. If these findings 
are correct, they suggest an obvious incentive for banks to 
get bigger by merging with other banks in the same market, 
regardless of cost or risk efficiencies. 
Concluding Remarks 
Consolidation in banking is not all it seems, and those who 
have enthusiastically applauded it are likely to be badly 
disappointed by its results. Contrary to popular belief, large 
banks are not more profitable than middle-sized ones or less 
likely to impose costs on the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. In fact, according to the data, middle-sized 
banks have had the advantage on both counts for roughly the 
past two decades. 
It's not even clear that banking is a declining industry, as 
many observers believe. That belief is hard to reconcile with 
the continued solid rate of new entries into the industry, for 
example. What is clear is that the nature of banking has 
changed so dramatically that market-share computations 
based on balance sheet data may be misleading. Much of the 
recent growth in commercial banking has been off-balance 
sheet and so invisible in such computations. 
If competitive market forces are not behind this trend to 
consolidation, another likely candidate is public sector 
interventions. We have identified aspects of public policy 
which arguably do produce nonmarket incentives for con-
solidation, especially larger average bank size. Admittedly, 
our argument is not conclusive, and we may have over-
looked some other significant causal factors. Nevertheless, 
our findings raise questions about current public policy 
toward banks. 
Particularly serious is this one: Are competitive forces 
and policy forces pushing the banking industry in opposite 
directions? By this we mean, is the market slowly eliminat-
ing large banks, while the government systematically resus-
citates some of them and encourages the formation of 
others? Just such a conflict has been described recently by 
Mayer (1991, p. 71), in a popular press article: 
These facts—the weakness of the big banks and the robustness 
of the smaller and regional banks—argue against the current 
10Under the U.S. Department of Justice 1982 Merger Guidelines, as revised in 
1984, a market in which the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
above 1800 is considered highly concentrated, and the Justice Department is likely 
to challenge a merger that increases the HHI by more than 50 points unless other 
factors indicate that the merger will not substantially lessen competition. In a 
subsequent change, in mergers involving commercial banking, the Justice Depart-
ment has indicated that in a market where the post-merger HHI is at least 1800, the 
merger generally will not be challenged unless it increases the HHI by at least 200 
points. The higher than normal HHI threshold for bank mergers implicitly 
recognizes the competitive effect of limited-purpose lenders and other nondepository 
financial entities. 
Perhaps nowhere is this policy shift more apparent than in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul area, a market dominated by two large bank holding companies. For 
several decades, there was essentially a regulatory moratorium on within-market 
acquisitions by those two large firms. Beginning in the 1980s, however, this policy 
changed markedly, and both firms were allowed to launch aggressive acquisition 
campaigns. 
From the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 until 1988, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System invoked the concentration issue 
in denying all applications for within-market acquisitions in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul banking market by First Bank System and Norwest, the two largest banking 
organizations. Since 1988, the Board has approved seven within-market acquisi-
tions by these two firms. Today, they control about 65 percent of total bank deposits 
in the market. 
I l l I I I l 
13 wisdom that says the salvation of the system is even bigger 
banks .... Using the taxpayers' money and credit in a futile 
effort to keep the whole herd alive could create another tragedy 
for the federal budget and for the future efficiency of financial 
intermediation in the U.S. 
This is a stronger statement than we would make now—and 
an analysis of such policy issues is beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, our findings here are not inconsistent 
with Mayer's view. Like him, we see scant evidence that 
further banking consolidation will benefit either the U.S. 
banking industry or the U.S. economy. 
Appendix 
The Effects of Financial Leverage 
In the profitability data discussed in the preceding paper, the 
largest banks did much worse than smaller banks when profits 
were measured by the return on assets (ROA), but not much worse 
when they were measured by the return on equity (ROE). Com-
pared to the size groups with the greatest profits in each period, the 
largest banks had an average ROA 35 percent smaller, but an 
average ROE only 11 percent smaller. 
This difference is traceable to the fact that, compared to 
smaller banks, larger banks operate with higher ratios of debt to 
assets, which is commonly known as leverage. Table 2 in the 
paper shows the equity/asset ratio, an inverse measure of leverage, 
for U.S. insured commercial banks between 1972 and 1990, 
grouped by size and by time period. In the table, leverage increases 
monotonically with bank size in every period. 
The differing effects of leverage on the ROA and the ROE can 
be demonstrated with a few equations. Let tt be profits; A, assets; 
L, liabilities (or debt); E, equity; r, the gross rate of interest on 
assets; and i, the rate of interest on debt. An equation for profits, 
then, would be 
(Al) 77 = rA-iL. 
With this notation, the return on assets (ROA) would be IT/A, and 
leverage, the debt/assets ratio, would be JJA. Then, if r is constant, 
the effect of a change in leverage on ROA would be 
(A2) d(u/A)/d(L/A) = -/. 
Similarly, the return on equity (ROE) would be ttIE, and another 
measure of leverage, the debt/equity ratio, would be LIE. With r 
constant, then, the effect of a change in leverage on ROE would 
be 
(A3) d{>nlE)ld(LIE) = (r -1) - (L/E)[dild(UE)]. 
An increase in leverage results in a decrease in the ROA. This 
is understandable. A shift of one dollar from equity to debt 
financing produces an increase in interest expense and a concomi-
tant decrease in profits. Since this shift doesn't change assets, the 
result will be a reduction in tt/A. However, an increase in leverage 
increases the ROE as long as the gross rate of return on assets 
exceeds the interest rate on debt (r > i) plus the increase in debt rate 
due to increased leverage [dild(LIE)]. 
The point of all this is that large banks partially offset their 
lower ROAs by using systematically more financial leverage. 
However, if other relevant factors do not change, then increased 
leverage increases the risk of bankruptcy. 
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